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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a product liability action based on claims of negligent failure to warn and strict

liability failure to warn.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On February 24, 2010, Ms. Major filed her complaint in the Fourth Judicial District

Court, Ada County, Idaho, seeking recovery for respiratory injuries she sustained as a result of
an occupational exposure to oleoresin capsicum aerosol.! In her complaint, Ms. Major brought
product liability claims under failure to warn and strict liability.2 On April 22, 2011, SEC filed a
motion for summary judgment. 3 On June 10, 2011, Ms. Major filed an opposition to SEC's
motion for summary judgment and cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability
only.4 On June 24, 2011, SEC moved to strike the affidavit of Ms. Major's expert, Dr. Yost. s
On July 14,2011, a hearing was held on the parties' competing motions for summary judgment
and SEC's motion to strike the affidavit of Dr. Yost. 6 By order entered on July 19, 2011, the
trial court denied SEC's motion to strike, granted in part and denied in part its motion for
summary judgment, and denied Ms. Major's cross motion for summary judgment. 7

I ROA 1, R. 10-20. Oleoresin capsicum is the active substance in products commonly referred to
as pepper spray.
2 R. 15-16.
3 R. 118-20.
4 R. 382-409.
5 R. 480-81.
6 Tr. (7/13/11), 5-95.
7 R. 1004-06.
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On July 22,2011, SEC filed a second motion for summary judgment. 8 On July 26,2011,
Ms. Major filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's July 19, 2011 order that partially granted
SEC's first motion for summary judgment, and submitted therewith a second affidavit from
Dr. Yost. 9

SEC moved to strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit. 1O

On September 15, 2011,

Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration and SEC's second motion for summary judgment and
motion to strike were heard and the trial court ruled from the bench, granting SEC's motion to
strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit, granting in part and denying in part SEC's second motion for
summary judgment, and denying Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration. II

The trial court

granted SEC's motion for summary judgment as to Ms. Major's chronic injury claims and denied
it as to her acute injury claims. 12
On September 20, 2011, SEC filed a motion for clarification, which the trial court treated
as a motion for summary judgment as to Ms. Major's acute injury claims, and on October 4,
2011, Ms. Major filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order granting in part and
denying in part SEC's second motion for summary judgment. 13 On October 17,2011, a hearing
was held on these motions, and the trial court entered its order on October 20, 2011, granting
SEC's third motion for summary judgment (filed as a motion for clarification) as to all claims,

R. 1007-09.
9 R. 1049-1252.
10 R. 1298-1302.
II Tr. (9/15/11), 96-164.
12 Tr. (9/15/11), 96-164.
13 R. 1599-1602, 1685-87.
8

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

2

and denying Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration. 14
On October 20, 2011, the trial court entered judgment in favor of SEC and against
Ms. Major. IS
On October 24,2011, Ms. Major filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's final order
granting of SEC's third motion for summary judgment (filed as a motion for clarification) and
SEC's to motion strike the second affidavit of Dr. Yost. 16 In support of her motion, Ms. Major
filed a third affidavit of Dr. YOSt.1 7
Ms. Major filed her Notice of Appeal on November 23, 2011. 18
On December 1, 2011, SEC moved to strike the third affidavit of Dr. YOSt.1 9 A hearing
was held on January 26, 2012, on Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration and SEC's motion to
strike Dr. Yost's third affidavit. 2o By its February 3, 2012 order, the trial court denied SEC's
motion to strike and Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration.

21

An amended judgment was entered on February 3, 2012, and Ms. Major filed her
amended notice of appeal on February 21, 2012. 22 SEC filed its notice of cross-appeal on
February 24,2012. 23

14 Tr. (10117111),181-200; R. 1739-42.
15 R. 1743-44.
16 R. 1745-46.
17 R. 1747-60, 1766-2037.
18 R. 2094-2102.
19 R. 2103-05.
20 Tr. (1126/12), 5-38.
21 R. 2236-39.
22 R. 2240-51.
23 R. 2252-54.
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C.

Statement of Facts 24
1. Plaintiff's Employment, Exposure, Injuries and Knowledge

a. Ms. Major was employed as a guard at the Idaho Department of Correction
C'IDOC") in July 2004. Medical records indicate she had suffered periodic bouts of respiratory
illness prior to and during her employment at IDOC. Up until March 3,2008, she was physically
able to perform her job as a guard. She worked at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution from
July 2004 to July 2006 and again from August or September 2007 to March 2008. During the
intervening periods, she worked at the South Boise Women's Correctional Facility.25
b. Ms. Major was frequently exposed to OC Spray at the IDOC. Her respiratory
problems became worse and she developed a chronic cough. She was, however, still able to
work, care for herself and participate in recreational activities as she had done before. In late
February/early March 2008, Ms. Major developed bronchitis and was placed on light duty. On
March 3,2008, she participated in an OC Spray training where she was exposed to SEC's MK-9
Fogger.

The MK-9 Fogger produces a widely dispersed aerosol.

The MK-9 Fogger was

designed specifically to irritate and int1ame the respiratory tract. Other of SEC's OC Spray
products included streams and foams specifically designed to cause irritation and int1ammation
of the eyes and skin. The fog products produce a fine aerosolized mist that hangs in the air and
is intended for wide dispersal or cross-contamination of large confined areas.

Factors that

24 Citations to the Record within the Statement of Facts are by a single footnote at the end of
each paragraph.
25 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 3, Ex. 1 (Pacheco Dep., 54:3 - 55:22, 73: 13 75:1,
120:2-21, 122:25 127:15, 142:9-17, and Ex. 72), ~9, Ex. 7 (Schaffer Dep., 90:16 91:16),
~ 11, Ex. 9 (Link Dep., 60:5-13)); 1058-63 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
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determine how much OC is inhaled include the level of ventilation in the area, the amount of OC
discharged, the size of the OC particulates suspended in the air, and the size of the space in
which the exposure takes place. By function of design, the stream and foam products have less
effect on the respiratory system than does the fogger. Conversely, the fogger has less effect on
the skin and eyes. 26
c. In the March 3, 2008 lOOC training which Ms. Major attended, the trainer
sprayed a random number of bursts of MK-9 Fogger into a cell where trainees entered
individually and remained until they breathed in the aerosol to experience the respiratory effect
of the MK-9 Fogger. The MK-9 Fogger instructions specifically limit the bursts to be used to
three, but those directions were not followed during the training. Trainees then exited the cell
and performed exercises under the effects of OC. Next, the trainees helped others through the
same procedure.

The exposure portion of the training lasted approximately two-and-a-half

hours, and was conducted indoors with poor ventilation. 27
d. After the March 3, 2008 lDOC training, Ms. Major was unable to work due to a
severe chronic cough that also prevented her from caring for herself and engaging in other
activities. While she had several trainings on OC Spray and generally understood that OC Spray
causes respiratory irritation, nothing in her training, experience or observations at the lOOC
regarding OC Spray informed her that there was a respiratory risk associated with the products.

R. 118-120 (Conf. Ex., Lloyd Aff., ,-r3, Ex. B (Kimmel Oep., 98:14 99:11),384-409 (Conf.
Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Oep., 51 :22 54:20)); 1058-63 (Major Aff., ,-r 3).
27 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 11, Ex. 9 (Link Dep., 57:1
58:25; 60:14 - 62:15));
1058-63 (Major Aff., ~ 4).
26
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She was not aware that chronic exposure could cause hypersensitivity to capsaicinoids and other
irritants. She was not aware that overexposure to OC Spray was dangerous and could cause
respiratory illness or aggravate an existing respiratory illness. As presented in the trainings and
on the labeling of SEC's SABRE Red products, Ms. Major believed that all the effects from OC
Spray were temporary and generally safe. She was never provided a copy of SEC's or any other
OC product manufacturer's MSDS for OC Spray products prior to her March 3, 2008 exposure.
During her employment at the IDOC, Ms. Major read the label of one of SEC's SABRE Red OC
Spray canisters-an OC Spray stream product which did not list respiratory irritation or illness,
or exacerbation of a respiratory illness, as a risk of exposure to the product. 28

e. Had she been informed of the health risks associated with OC Spray and, in
particular, the MK-9 Fogger, Ms. Major would have insisted that she be permitted to opt out of
the March 3, 2008 training.

Had the negative health effects been made known to IDOC

employees, it is likely the trainers would have designed the training on March 3, 2008
differently. Had the risks of OC Spray been made known to her but could not be avoided in the
job, Ms. Major would have found another job?9

f. Following the March 3, 2008 exposure to SEC's MK-9 Fogger, Ms. Major
received a diagnosis of: (1) irritant triggered vocal cord dysfunction, secondary cough,
attributable to OC exposure at IDOC; (2) esophageal dysmotility and reflux aggravated by
occupational exposure to OC, weight gain due to lack of inability to exercise, and medications;

R. 1058-63 (Major Aff., ~~ 5-7).
29 R. 1058-63 (Major Aff., ~~ 5-7).
28
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(3) chronic severe cough-multifactorial;

and (4) restless leg syndrome.

Dr. Pacheco,

Ms. Major's physician who rendered this diagnosis, testified regarding a study from 1998 that
recognized a condition referred to as irritant associated vocal cord dysfunction. 3o

2. SEC's Knowledge of Risks Posed by OC Spray
g. SEC marketed its MK-9 Fogger to law enforcement to be used for crowd control,
cell extractions, and situations requiring a lot of cross-contamination. The MK-9 Fogger was
designed to have "more of an impact on the respiratory tract" than the stream and foam products.
SEC understood how OC caused irritation and inflammation of the respiratory tract through
nerve receptors, and had reviewed research on the effects of capsicum on the respiratory tract.
SEC's vice-president decided to test its OC products for the effects on the eyes and skin and for
acute effects of acute exposure to the respiratory tract. SEC did not test for health effects of
chronic exposure, or for chronic health effects from acute exposure. SEC knew a safety concern
existed with OC Spray when used on people with respiratory illness:
Q. Okay. Particularly there are concerns with the safety of OC products
when used on individuals with pulmonary issues, generally?

***

Q. Respiratory issues.
A. The effects may be greater.
SEC's vice-president also knew that exposure to OC in higher concentrations, such as products
sold by other manufacturers selling 1.45%, 2.0%, and maybe even 3.0% capsaicinoids OC Spray
products, was irresponsible because they are dangerous. The risks of those products, according
R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 3, Ex. 1 (Pacheco Dep., 28:2-22, 34:1
64:14, and Exs. 69, 72 (Bates Nos. NJH 48, 63,80-87), & 73)).
30
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38:11,47:1

to SEC's vice-president, were that they "Cause -- could cause some -- could possibly cause longterm damage or extremely long recovery periods."} 1
3. Second Yost Affidavit
h. In his second affidavit, Dr. Yost testified unequivocally that it is his expert

opinion, based on his education, research, and training, that the scientific literature and studies in
existence prior to 2008 were such that, when viewed as a body of literature and human and
animal studies, it was known that a product such as SEC's MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of both
acute and chronic respiratory injury such as that described in Ms. Major's medical records.}2
i.

Dr. Yost explained that the articles he cited previously in his First Affidavit and in

his deposition as a basis for his opinions in his report, that were published in 2008 and later, were
not necessary to that part of his opinion relating to the foreseeability of acute and chronic injury
such as those documented in Ms. Major's medical history as being caused by exposure to OC
Spray. He explains that based on what was known prior to 2008 about capsaicinoids, Transient
Receptor Potential (TRP) calcium channels and neurogenic inflammation of the respiratory
tissues, the risk posed by a product like the MK-9 Fogger of acute and chronic respiratory injury
such as documented in Ms. Major's medical records would be known. Dr. Yost testified that his
opinion is based on a whole body of scientific literature that predates 2008. He also identified
four additional publications from 1993,2002,2005 and 2006 that support his opinion relating to
31 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 21:24 43:11,44:12-17,50:10
- 59:17,63:6-22,64:3 65:4,130:7 - 137:25,139:10 140:12,157:14 163:5, and Exs. B, L0)). Substance P is the neuropeptide that binds with the capsaicinoid receptor TRVP 1 as
discussed in Dr. Yost's opinion report.
32 R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aff., ~ 9).
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foreseeability of acute and chronic respiratory injury. He also provided three separate reviews
that cite several hundred pre-2008 studies that support his opinion regarding the known risk of
acute and chronic respiratory injury posed by products like the MK-9 Fogger. 33
j. Dr. Yost explained the known mechanism of respiratory injury caused by

exposure to Oc. According to Dr. Yost, there is no doubt that the literature and studies existing
prior to 2008 established within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the inflammatory
properties associated with capsaicinoids greatly enhance the sensitivity of neuronal and
respiratory tissues to an array of irritants by an increase in the number and/or responsiveness of
TRP receptors populating respiratory tissues. Once a higher sensitivity develops in an affected
individual, the neurogenic inflammatory response in the respiratory tissues will occur at a lower
threshold than in the non-sensitized population. Once an individual has become sensitized to
capsaicin, the threshold for activation of the neurogenic inflammatory response by exposure to
irritants other than capsaicin is also lowered. Capsaicin and its involvement in the sensitization
process were well understood prior to 2008. Thus, even prior to 2008, people with asthma
and/or chronic cough, including Ms. Major, would have been expected to be much more
sensitive to the pathological effects of pepper sprays. That is, a person such as Ms. Major who
was already sensitized to some extent would be expected to become increasingly sensitized by
repeated and/or high levels of respiratory exposure to OC spray.34
k. People with greater sensitivity to capsaicin are expected to have increased TRPVI

33 R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aff., ~~ 10-13).
34 R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aff., ~~ 10-13).
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receptor populations. Other important TRP channels exist, and several of them, particularly
TRPAI, are activated by irritants such as those that exist in cigarette smoke and other
environmental sources. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the multiple TRP channels to act in
concert with each other to result in higher acute respiratory responses to a multitude of
respiratory irritants in people with increased sensitivity to capsaicinoids. That is to say, once the
TRP receptor population is up-regulated and hypersensitivity occurs, the individual will
thereafter experience acute respiratory responses to respiratory irritants, whether from capsaicin,
cigarette smoke or other environmental sources, at exposure levels that would not evoke a
significant response in persons who have not been sensitized. The hypersensitivity of affected
individuals to a whole array of respiratory irritants would be expected to elicit respiratory
symptoms that are, for all intents and purposes, chronic due to the frequency of recurrence of
acute respiratory responses to irritants encountered in everyday life. 35
l.

After being informed that the trial court perceived the post-exposure dated articles

(2008 and more recent articles) cited by Dr. Yost as being required to support his conclusion that
it was known prior to 2008 that a product like the MK-9 Fogger posed a risk of causing acute
and chronic respiratory injury, Dr. Yost, in his Third Affidavit, identified additional literature
and studies that were published prior to 2008 (pre-exposure) that also support his conclusion.
However, the pre-2008 articles previously cited by Dr. Yost were sufficient to support his
conclusion regarding the foreseeability issue. As he stated in his prior affidavit, those articles are

35

R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aff., ~~ 10-13).
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just part of a much larger body ofliterature and studies that support his conclusion. 36
ID.

For instance, Dr. Yost identified three reviews of the science regarding

capsaicinoids, TRP receptors, sensitization, and respiratory illness. Even though all three were
published in 2009 and 2010, they provide a fair overview of the state of knowledge prior to 2008
because they are based on pre-2008 research. Of the 58 cited studies in Lu-Yuan Lee and Qihai
Gu's ROLE OFTRPVl IN INFLAMMATION-INDUCED AIRWAY HYPERSENSITIVITY, Current Opinion

in Pharmacology, 9:243-249 (2009), in which the authors provided a review of some of the
literature and studies of TRPVl and its role in airway hypersensitivity and related airway
diseases, only eight studies were published in 2008 or later. A similar review was published in

Pulmonary Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 22:65-70 (2009), by John 1. Adcock entitled TRPVl
RECEPTORS IN SENSITIZATION OF COUGH AND PAIN REFLEXES. Of the 59 articles cited in the
review, only three were published in 2008 and none of them were published after 2008. Another
informative review was by K. Alawi and J. Keeble published in Pharmacology and

Therapeutics, 125: 181-195 (2010), THE PARADOXICAL ROLE OF

THE

TRANSIENT RECEPTOR

POTENTIAL VANILLOID 1 RECEPTOR IN INFLAMMATION. Of the 226 studies cited in this review,
only fourteen were published in or after 2008. All three of these reviews support Dr. Yost's
conclusion about the state of the science at the time SEC sold the MK-9 Fogger to IDOC. 37

R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aff., ,-r~ 6-13), 1747-60, 1766-2037 (Yost 3d Aft, ,-r~ 2-15).
37 R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aft, ,-r 13). See also, R. 384-409 (Cont Ex., Overson Aff.,,-r 3, Ex. 1
(Pacheco Dep., 47:4 - 55:25, 88:11 - 90:23, 121:10-24, and Ex. 73) (discussing known
relationship between respiratory irritants such as capsicum and vocal cord dysfunction, including
an article published in 1998, and Ms. Major' s case)).
36
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4. SEC's MK-9 Fogger Label
n. SEC's MK-9 Fogger label does not provide a warning that it is an irritant or an

inflammatory to the respiratory tract. The label states "Caution: Severe Skin and Eye Irritant,"
"Contents Under Pressure" and "See Other Warnings On Back Label." The back label provides
no warnings relating to inhalation. 38 And while SEC's vice-president testified that if a person is
suffering asthma, emphysema, or bronchitis, they "recommend that they not be exposed," such a
warning does not appear on the label. Even though SEC knew that OC is a respiratory irritant;
that the MK-9 Fogger was designed specifically to cause respiratory tract inflammation; and that
overexposure could be dangerous: the label has nothing warning of respiratory irritation, the
risks of overexposure, or what action to take or avoid in order for users to protect themselves. 39
o. SEC developed an MSDS for each of its OC Spray products that identified the

product as causing "irritation through all routes of entry" and identifying it as a severe skin and
eye irritant. SEC identified its product as being a hazard to the eyes: "Liquid or vapors may
cause redness, burning, tearing, swelling, and/or pain." And it identified the product as a hazard
to the skin: "Frequent or repeated contact with skin may cause skin irritation and dermatitis."
And a hazard when ingested: "Ingestion may cause nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea." The
MSDS stated that, when inhaled, the product "may cause irritation of the respiratory tract."
Finally, the MSDS warned, under "Medical Conditions Aggravated," that the product "may

R. 1064-1252 (Yost 2d Aff., ~ 13).
39 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Af£, ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 44: 12 - 48:6,90:4 - 94:24, and
Exs. B, D & E), ~9, Ex. 7 (Schaffer Dep., 76:4 -77:1)); 1051-57 (Overson Af£, ~3, Ex. 1
(clean copy ofMK-9 Fogger label)).
38
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cause more severe, temporary, effects on those persons who are asthmatics or suffer from
emphysema.,,40

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to SEC when a genuine

issue of material fact existed as to whether SEC knew or should have known at the time of sale
that its SABRE Red products pose a risk of respiratory injury?
B.

Did the trial court err by striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit as a sham affidavit

when there was no actual conflict between his deposition testimony and the affidavit?
C.

Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration

where Dr. Yost's final affidavit explained any perceived conflict between his deposition
testimony and his prior affidavits?
D.

Did the trial court err when it granted SEC summary judgment as to Ms. Major's

claims for acute injury when there were no warnings on the product label of any kind of
respiratory injury, and the type of acute injury Ms. Major suffered was not known to her?
E.

Did the trial court err when it dismissed Ms. Major's acute injury claim on

summary judgment and her claims for all damages arising from her acute injuries?
F.

Is Ms. Major entitled to an award of fees and costs on appeal?

III. ARGUMENT
To prove her claim for negligent failure to warn, under either negligence or strict liability,

40 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 124:25 - 127:21, and Ex. J,
Bates Nos. SEC 22-24)).
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Ms. Major was required to show that SEC "knew or should have known that danger to users or
bystanders could result from a particular use ofthe product.,,41 A product may be defective in its
design, manufacture, or due to a "failure to adequately warn the consumer of a hazard involved
in the foreseeable use of the product.,,42 "A product has a defect when it exposes a user or
bystander to an unreasonable risk of physical injury, or if it is more dangerous than would be
expected by an ordinary person who may reasonably be expected to use it.,,43
What a manufacturer knew or should have known when it sold its product is determined
by looking to the state of knowledge within the relevant professional community.44 The relevant
professional community in this case extends beyond the manufacturing community to include the
scientific, industrial safety, engineering, and medical professions.45 It is not required that the

See I.D.J.I. 10.06 (Product Liability-Failure to Warn-Issues); LDJ.I. 10.04 (Product
Liability-Strict Liability-Issues); Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 821 (1999); Toner v.
Lederle Lab., 112 Idaho 328 (1987); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 759 (1974); I.C. §§ 61401, et seq.; Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, comment h (1977).
42 I.D.J.I. 10.01.1; Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 1174 (1999).
43 LD.J.I. 10.01.1; Puckett v. Oalifabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816,979 P.2d 1174 (1999).
th
44 Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344,347 (5 Cir. 1983).
45 See, e.g., Carter, 716 F.2d at 347 ('''state of the art' refers to the technological environment,
that is, what can be done"); Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Az.
App. 1985) ("state of the art refers to what feasibly could have been done"); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Gregg, 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1155-56 (Ind. App. 1990) (defining state of the art as
technological advancement, not as industry custom or practice); Chown v. USM Corp., 297
N. W.2d 218, 222 (Iowa 1980) (defining state of the art as technological and practical feasibility);
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 182,463 A.2d 298 (1983) (defining state of the art as
"existing level of technological expertise and scientific knowledge relevant to a particular
industry at the time a product is designed"); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d
743, 748 (Tex. 1980) ("[state of the art] includes the scientific knowledge, economic feasibility,
and the practicalities of implementation when the product was manufactured"); see also
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d (1996) § 30:50, p. 30-77 ('" [s ]tate of the art' has
been defined as the safety, technical, mechanical, and scientific knowledge in existence and
41
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Plaintiff produce a single definitive study that shows that the danger was known.

A.

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Existed as to Whether SEC Knew or
Should Have Known That Its Product Posed a Risk of Respiratory Injury
1. Standard of Review
This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo and it applies

the same standards used by the trial

COurt.

46 A grant of summary judgment is warranted where it

is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.,,47 The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the
non-moving party.48

All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving

party.49
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the genuine issue of material fact burden may be carried by establishing the
absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 50
Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the
moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the
contention that such proof of an element is lacking. 51 Once such an absence of evidence has
been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further
reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture." See Tr. (9114111), 141: 12-25, where the
trial court states the standards as what the manufacturer would know.
46 Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,394 (2008).
47 LR.C.P. 56(c).
48 Renzo v. Idaho State Dep 't. ofAgric., 149 Idaho 777, 779 (2010).
49 Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712 (App. 2000).
50 Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712 (App. 2000).
51 Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc., l34 Idaho 711, 712 (App. 2000).
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depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to
offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under LR.C.P. 56(£).52 "The burden of proving
the absence of an issue of material fact rests at all times upon the moving party.,,53
Motions for reconsideration are matters for the trial court's discretion. 54 "A party making
a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, but is not required to do SO.,,55
2. It Was Error to Grant SEC Summary Judgment on the Foreseeability Element
of Ms. Major's Claims Because It Was Known at the Time SEC Sold Its Product
That OC Exposure Posed a Risk of Respiratory Injury
The affidavits of Dr. Yost presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SEC
knew or should have known that its SABRE Red MK-9 Fogger posed a danger of causing the
kind of respiratory injury suffered by Ms. Major when it sold the product to IDOC in 2008. 56
Dr. Yost's first affidavit established his credentials as an expert in the area of toxico logy
of the respiratory tract and as having "conducted extensive research into the mechanisms
responsible for human lung disease caused by particulate matter in air pollution. 57 He explained
that he had conducted extensive work studying "'irritant receptors' that are expressed on human
lung epithelial cells and are activated by particulates in polluted air and by capsaicinoids that are
present in pepper sprays.,,58

Dr. Yost's "work has provided compelling evidence for the

Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712 (App. 2000).
53 Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577 (2004) (emphasis added).
54 Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592 (2001).
55 Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 118 Idaho 812,823 (1990).
56 R. 410-60, 1064-1252, 1747-60, 1766-2037.
57 R. 409-10.
58 R. 411.
52
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importance of these receptors in human lung disease.,,59
Dr. Yost reviewed the discovery materials produced by the parties in this case, including
depositions and the medical records of Ms. Major, and summarized those facts most important to
his opinions. 6o

Dr. Yost explained that, in reaching his opinions, he "relied on a body of

scientific research relating to the effects of capsaicinoids on human and animal tissues," and
specifically identified some of that research. 61 Dr. Yost was careful to point out that the research
articles identified in his affidavit were "just a few of many that support [his] opinions as
expressed in [his] report in this case. ,,62
Dr. Yost's report included his opinion that during Ms. Major's employment at IDOe, she
became
highly sensitized to the capsaicinoids in OC products, and showed
increased frequency and severity of respiratory illness, including
bronchitis and chronic cough. Her training exposure to Sabre Red (a 10%
product) in an enclosed, non-ventilated room for two and half hours on
March 3, 2008 certainly caused acute adverse health responses, and
greatly exacerbated her underlying respiratory diseases. 63
In his report, Dr. Yost explained the acute toxicities of OC as including "respiratory apnea,
choking, and uncontrolled cough that can lead to severe respiratory depression, cardiovascular
dysfunction, and death." He identified the hallmark acute response to OC exposure as being

59 R.
R.
61 R.
62 R.
63 R.

60

41l.
411-12.
412-13.
413.
459.
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extensive inflammation in different organs and tissues. 64 Dr. Yost also identified the chronic
toxicity associated with OC:
The biological responses to OC products are caused predominantly by
binding of capsaicinoids to Transient Receptor Potential (TRP) calcium
channels. The population of TRP channels in tissues is regulated by
multiple exposures, and the number and activities ofTRP channels usually
determine the responses to chronic exposures that lead to sensitization or
desensitization from multiple exposures in multiple organ systems. One
highly characterized toxicity of capsaicinoids is the exacerbation of
chronic cough, and people with this respiratory disease are up to 30times more sensitive to capsaicin-induced cough. The scientific
explanation for their heightened responses is that these sensitized people
have a much higher expression ofTRP channels in their airway nerves. 65
Dr. Yost also testified that the danger of respiratory injury from OC exposure was known
at the time that SEC sold its product to IDOC. 66
Based on my review of the above-cited articles and my education,
training, research, and knowledge of the scientific literature in the relevant
area, it is my opinion that the risks to the respiratory tract posed by
exposure to SEC's Sabre Red law enforcement 10% OC Spray (MK-9
Fogger) were known and foreseeable risks at the time SEC sold its product
67
to the IDOC.
Dr. Yost's affidavit was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the
element of whether SEC knew or should have known that its product posed a risk of injury such
as that suffered by Ms. Major. Initially, during oral argument on SEC's motion for summary
judgment, the court recognized that Dr. Yost's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact:
[Dr. Yost] cites to these articles and he says, and this is-here's my

64
65
66
67

R.
R.
R.
R.

460.
460 (emphasis added).
413-14.
413.
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problem, because the biggest problem I have is I can't make credibility
determinations, I mean, that's a - I just can't do that.
He says its now known-its known now and it was known prior to 2008
that people with asthma and chronic cough are more sensitive to pepper
spray than others. And he says people with greater sensitivity to capsacin
would be expected to have increased TRPV1 receptor populations. And
then he talks about how they are activated by irritants including cigarette
smoke and other environmental sources.
And he goes - it seems to me that he is saying that this is - this - the
possible effect of chronic condition-that would cause a chronic
condition, in fact, was well known. How do I - I mean, how do I ignore
that?68
However, the trial court erred when it interpreted Dr. Yost's deposition testimony as
saying there were no studies that would put SEC on notice that there was a risk of chronic injury
such as that suffered by Ms. Major. 69 As is set forth in sections IILA.4, III.B and IH.C of this
brief, infra, Dr. Yost did not testify as such in his deposition. Furthermore, SEC has never cited
any authority that requires a plaintiff in a failure to warn product liability case, at summary
judgment or otherwise, to prove the foreseeability element by such definitive evidence.
Ms. Major met the relevant foreseeability element of her case by showing that the risks of
chronic respiratory injury should have been known by SEC in light of available scientific
knowledge that existed at the time the product was sold to the IDOC. Information known in the
scientific and expert community regarding the dangers of a particular product will be imputed to
the manufacturer when assessing what the manufacturer should have known at the time of sale:
[T]he presence of the required knowledge can be established by evidence
that the dangerous quality of the product should have been known by a
Tr. (7114/11), 18:11 - 19:4.
69 Tr. (7114111), 45:4-8,79:17 - 86:9. See specifically Tr. (7114/11), 82:4-10.
68
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manufacturer because it was known in the scientific or expert community.
As Judge John Minor Wisdom stated for the court in another case
involving a claimed injury from asbestos,
[I]n cases such as the instant case, the manufacturer is held to the
knowledge and skill of an expert. This is relevant in determining
(1) whether the manufacturer knew or should have known the
danger.... The manufacturer's status as expert means that at a
minimum he must keep abreast of scientific knowledge,
discoveries, and advances and is presumed to know what is
imparted thereby.
The same point was made by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.:
Industry standards and state of the art are not synonymous. State
of the art includes all of the available knowledge on a subject at
a given time, and this includes scientific, medical, engineering,
and any other knowledge that may be available. State ofthe art
includes the element of time: What is known and when was this
knowledge available. 70
Other courts have similarly held that the knowledge of available scientific data will be
imputed to the manufacturer for the purpose of determining whether there was sufficient notice
of the dangers involved:
The conduct should be measured by knowledge at the time the
manufacturer distributed the product. Given the scientific, technological
and other information available when the product was distributed, did the
manufacturer know or should he have known of the danger. In other

Owen-Illinois, Inc., v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 639-40 (Md. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5 th Cir.1982);
Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5 th Cir. 1978); Shell Oil Co. v.
Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (Az. 1978); Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 77 Cal.Rptr.
709, 713 (3d Dist. App. 1969); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198-200 (Ill.
1980); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Mich. 1979); McKee v. Moore,
648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982); Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 906-907 (Ore. 1966); C. Marvel,
Annotation, STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO WARN AS DEPENDENT ON
DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368 (1984), and cases cited therein).
70

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 20

words, did he have actual or constructive knowledge of the danger. A
product-related danger may be regarded as knowable "if the available
scientific data gave rise to a reasonable inference that the danger is
likely to exist." A manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of an
expert, and is required to test his products and keep abreast of scientific
discoveries related to his products, but he has a duty to warn only of
dangers that the employment of the reasonable foresight of an expert could
reveal. 71

It should also be emphasized that the knowledge imputed to the manufacturer is not
merely the standard within the relevant industry:
The majority of courts, however, have defined state-of-the-art evidence as
the level of relevant scientific, technological and safety knowledge
existing and reasonably feasible at the time of design.72

Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 538-39 (Me. 1986) (emphasis added)
(citing Wade, On The Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 734, 749 (1983); Borel v. Fibreboard Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-1090 (5 th Cir.)
(Wisdom, J.) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See generally lA L.
Frumer & M. Friedman, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.07[3] (1985)).
72 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tools Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1346 (Conn. 1997) (citing Carter v.
JUassey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5 th Cir. 1983) ('''state of the art' refers to the
technological environment, that is, what can be done" [emphasis in original]); Gosewisch v.
American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365,370 (Az. App. 1985) ("state of the art refers to what
feasibly could have been done"); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg, 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1155-56
(Ind. App. 1990) (defining state of the art as technological advancement, not as industry custom
or practice); Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218,222 (Iowa 1980) (defining state of the art
as technological and practical feasibility); 0 'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304-05
(N.J. 1983) (defining state of the art as "existing level of technological expertise and scientific
knowledge relevant to a particular industry at the time a product is designed"); Boatland of
Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980) ("[state of the art] includes the
scientific knowledge, economic feasibility, and the practicalities of implementation when the
product was manufactured"); see also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d (1996)
§ 30:50, p. 30-77 C"[s]tate of the art' has been defined as the safety, technical, mechanical, and
scientific knowledge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of manufacture"));
see also, Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 2000) (distinguishing between custom
of the industry and "state of the art" and concluding that the relevant question is not what others
were doing at the time but "whether the evidence disclosed that anything more could reasonably
and economically be done.").
71
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The law places on the manufacturer an affirmative duty to investigate and test. Where
investigation and/or testing would have revealed a danger that arises under normal use of the
product, the manufacturer must warn of the danger. 73 For instance, in a case where there were no
known reports of mini-trampolines causing users to suffer stress fractures, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision dismissing the case. 74 The district court dismissed on the
grounds that the manufacturer did not know and should not have known of the danger of stress
fractures caused by the normal use of mini-trampolines. 75 The plaintiffs experts testified at trial
that
observations from very simple tests, interpreted in light of well-established
knowledge about the structure of the foot and the causes of stress
fractures, would have made it apparent that the repetitive use of the minitrampoline for jogging could cause stress fractures. Two experts testified
the danger was well within the state of society's knowledge about such
matters. One of Richter's experts pointed out that although there were no
known reports concerning mini-trampolines as a cause of stress fractures,
sport and exercise magazines as well as scientific and medical journals
have long published articles establishing that repetitive jogging can cause
stress fractures. 76
Quoting an earlier district court case applying Kansas law, the Tenth Circuit explained the duty
placed on the manufacturer:

Richter v. Limax Intern., Inc., 45 F.3d 1464, 1468-69 (loth Cir. 1995); see a/so, Afercer v.
Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602,624 (Iowa 2000) (the inquiry in a negligent failure to warn case
73

"is whether a reasonable manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger, in light of the
generally recognized and prevailing best scientific knowledge, yet failed to provide adequate
warning to users or customers. ").
74 Richter, 45 F.3d at 1468-69.
75 Richter, 45 F.3d at 1468-69.
76 Richter, 45 F.3d at 1467.
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Ordinarily, a manufacturer has a duty under Kansas law to warn
consumers and users of its products when it knows or has reason to know
that its product is or is likely to be dangerous during normal use. The duty
to warn is a continuous one, requiring the mamifacturer to keep abreast of

the current state of knowledge of its products as acquired through
research, adverse reaction reports, scientific literature, and other
available methods. A manufacturer's failure to adequately warn of its
product's reasonably foreseeable dangers renders that product defective
under the doctrine of strict liability. 77
Thus, there is no standard that exists that would require Ms. Major to point to one
definitive study conclusively demonstrating that the MK-9 Fogger would cause her chronic
respiratory injury. All that is required is that she show that a product-related danger may be
regarded as knowable based upon the available scientific data that gives rise to a reasonable
inference that the danger is likely to exist.

3. Nothing in the Federal Hazardous Substance Act Requires Plaintiff to Prove the
Existence of a Single Definitive Study Showing That Exposure to OC Spray
Causes Chronic Respiratory Illness Such as That Suffered by Ms. Major
The trial court found the applicable labeling standards for SEC's OC products was the
Federal Hazardous Substance Act. 78

However, there is nothing in the FHSA that requires

Ms. Major to prove that a definitive study was published prior to the date of sale showing a
conclusive causal link between SEC's product and Ms. Major's injuries. The applicable law
under the FHSA is found at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1261(f), which defines a "hazardous substance" as:
1. Any substance or mixture of substances which (i) is toxic, (ii) is
corrosive, (iii) is an irritant, (iv) is a strong sensitizer, (v) is flammable or
combustible, or (vi) generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or

77

Richter, 45 F.3d at 1468 (quoting Pfeiffer v. Eagle NIfg. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (D. Kan.

1991)) (emphasis added).
Tr. (7/14111), 86:10 - 90:14.

78
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other means, if such substances or mixture of substances may cause
substantial personal injury or substantial illness during or as a proximate
result of any customary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use,
including reasonably foreseeable ingestion by children. 79
The term "toxic" is defined under the statute as "any substance (other than a radioactive
substance) which has the capacity to produce personal injury or illness to man through ingestion,
inhalation, or absorption through any body surface.,,8o The term "corrosive" is defined under the
statute as "any substance which in contact with living tissue will cause destruction of tissue by
chemical action; but shall not refer to action on inanimate surfaces.,,81 The term "irritant" is
defined under the statute as "any substance not corrosive within the meaning of subparagraph
(i)82 of this section which on immediate, prolonged, or repeated contact with normal living tissue
will induce a local inflammatory reaction .. ,83
Thus, under the FHSA, there is no requirement that Ms. Major point to one single study
definitively demonstrating that if you expose people to OC Spray they will sutTer the type of
chronic illness sutTered by Ms. Major. All that is required under the FHSA is that Ms. Major
show that the substance in question is a hazardous substance as defined by the FHSA, and that
the product was not appropriately labeled. Ms. Major made the first showing through Dr. Yost's
affidavit, and made the second showing by proof of the contents of SEC's product labels.

79

80
81
82
83

15 V.S.C.A.
15 V.S.C.A.
15 V.S.C.A.
Referencing
15 V.S.C.A.

§ 1261(t)(a)(A).
§ 1261(g).
§ 1261(i).
15 V.S.C.A. § 1261(t)(i).
§ 1261(j).
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4. The Trial Court Erred When It Misread Dr. Yost's Affidavit
The trial court also erred when it mistakenly concluded that Dr. Yost had limited his
conclusions in his first affidavit regarding the foreseeability of injury to acute injury. In his
affidavit, Dr. Yost stated in paragraphs six and seven the following:
6. The articles cited above are just a few of many that support my
opinions as expressed in my report in this case. Based on my review of
the above-cited articles and my education, training, research, and
knowledge of the scientific literature in the relevant area, it is my opinion
that the risks to the respiratory tract posed by exposure to SEC's SABRE
Red law enforcement 10% OC Spray (MK-9 Fogger) were known and
foreseeable risks at the time SEC sold its product to IDOC.
7. It is known now and it was known prior to 2008 that people with
asthma and chronic cough are more sensitive to pepper spray than other
people with normal respiratory function. People with greater sensitivity to
capsaicin would be expected to have increased TRPV1 receptor
populations. Other important TRP channels exist, and several of them,
particularly TRPA1, are activated by irritants, such as those that exist in
cigarette smoke, and other environmental sources. Thus, it is reasonable
to expect the multiple TRP channels act in concert with each other to
result in higher acute respiratory responses to a multitude of respiratory
irritants, particularly in people with increased sensitivity to pepper
sprays.84

During the hearing, the trial court stated: "And then the paragraph that you point to as talking
about that, [paragraph seven], about being known in 2008, he says acute.

He doesn't say

chronic.,,85 However, the trial court read the sentence out of context. Read in the context of
Dr. Yost's entire affidavit and his report, it is clear that what he was referring to is that people
with hypersensitivity to pepper spray caused by exposure will thereafter have "higher acute

84 R. 413-14.
85 Tr. (7/14111), 49:9-11.
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respiratory responses to a multitude of respiratory irritants.,,86

5. The Trial Court Erred When It Concluded That Dr. Yost Was Expressing an
Inadmissible Legal Conclusion When He Stated in His Affidavit That the Risk
of Harm Was Foreseeable at the Time SEC Sold Its Product to IODC
The trial court also erred when it determined that Dr. Yost's conclusion that the risks of
injury were foreseeable when SEC sold its product to IDOC was a legal conclusion. 87
Foreseeability is normally a question of fact for the jury, and is not a legal conclusion. 88
Nevertheless, in making its ruling, the trial court mistakenly substituted its own judgment for the
. dgment 0 f th'
JU
e Jury. 89

6. Conclusion
Dr. Yost explained his opinion and the basis for it in his affidavit, that at the time SEC
sold SABRE Red to IDOC, it should have known of both the acute and chronic risks associated
with the product. His affidavit met the requirements for admissibility of expert opinion and
presented a genuine issue of material fact for the jury. As such, it was error for the trial court to
grant SEC summary judgment on the issue of foreseeability.
B.

It Was Error to Strike Dr. Yost's Second Affidavit by Applying the
Sham Affidavit Doctrine Since No Actual Conflict Existed

The trial court erred when it granted SEC's motion to strike Dr. Yost's affidavit filed in
support of Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration on the grounds of the sham affidavit doctrine,

86 R. 414.
87 Tr. (7114111), 36:15 43:19.
88 See Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America, 112 Idaho 277, 283 (1986) ("The factual question of
foreseeability is for the jury to determine).
89 See Tr. (91151111), 96:20 - 97:6, 102:8
106: 19, 113:8 - 114:10, 127:16.
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since there was no conflict between the affidavit and Dr. Yost's deposition testimony. Before
the court can strike an affidavit as being a sham, there must be a factual finding that the affidavit
'~flatlv

contradicts earlier testimony in an attempt to ·create' an issue of fact and avoid summary

judgment. ... [T]he district court must make a factual determination that the contradiction was
actually a ·sham.",90 Furthermore, in construing whether there is a conflict, a court must view
the facts stated in the affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party.91 Apparent conflict between statements made in
an affidavit and deposition testimony is no reason to strike the affidavit. 92 Unless there is an
unambiguous direct conflict between the two, the resolution of any apparent conflict is a
credibility issue for the jury. 93
In support of her motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order granting SEC
summary judgment, Ms. Major filed a second affidavit of Dr. Yost wherein he clarified that his
opinion was that the risk of a chronic respiratory injury such as that suffered by Ms. Major was a
known risk of OC exposure when SEC sold its product to IDOC; and that opinion was supported

Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9 th Cir. 1991) (cited in Frazier v.
JR. Simplot, 136 Idaho 100, 103 (2001» (emphasis added).
91 Frazier, 136 Idaho at 104.
92 AI/oins v. Cach, 143 Idaho 221, 225-26 (2006) (apparent conflict is no reason to strike. It is
then just a credibility issue); Frazier v. J.R. Simplot, 136 Idaho 100, 103-4 (2001) (a no answer
to the question whether deponent was verbally and physically abused was not in conflict with
affidavit stating that physical abuse had occurred, it was error to strike the affidavit since the
deposition was ambiguous); Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298 (App. 1994) (vague and
uncertain testimony does not directly contradict a clarifying affidavit).
93 Mains, 143 Idaho at 225-26; Frazier, 136 Idaho at 103-4; Estate ofKeeven, 126 Idaho at 298.
90

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 27

by scientific literature that was in existence prior to 2008 when SEC sold its product to IDOC. 94
SEC moved to strike the affidavit and the trial court granted the motion after finding that
Dr. Yost's second affidavit was a sham. 95
SEC argued that when Dr. Yost was questioned in his deposition, he "responded,
unequivocally and on several occasions, that SEC could not have known or foreseen those
alleged risks at that time.,,96 SEC claimed to have "questioned Dr. Yost extensively as to what
information, literature and scientific knowledge was available to SEC at the time it manufactured
and sold the OC Spray at issue, and whether SEC could have known or foreseen the risk of longterm chronic injuries akin to what Plaintiff alleges in this litigation.,,97 For both propositions,
SEC cites the deposition of Dr. Yost at pages 153, line 16, to page 156, line 10. 98 The testimony
cited by SEC is as follows:

Q. In your opinion, as of March of2008, was there anything defmitively
published in the peer-reviewed scientific and medical literature that
would have put a manufacturer of pepper spray products such as
SEC on notice that exposure to their products by somebody with the
chronic health conditions of Ms. Major would have caused her an
exacerbated response which would have included an ongoing chronic
cough for the subsequent period of time?
A. I don't think it's possible for me to place a nefarious intent. You
know, the responsibility of whether or not there was sufficient
evidence there to say, you know, if you do -- if you expose somebody
to this, they are going to have life-altering changes. I don't think that
existed then. In the literature today I don't think it exists except
through the preponderance of evidence, and it may very well be that
94 R.
95 R.
96 R.
97 R.
98 R.

1098-1252.
1298-1302, 1739-42.
1335.
1334-35.
1334-35.
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other people don't believe that that's the case, but I do. And so, you
know, blame is for the jury to decide.
Q. Well, do you think people that were trained in toxicology such as
yourself would have been able to review the medical literature and the
scientific literature that existed on or prior to March of 2008 and have
been able to determine that there would have been a life-altering
condition that resulted from pepper spray exposure?
A. I don't see evidence that the normal ways for industrial hygiene
officers and personnel to evaluate such kinds of exposures mayor may
not have existed at that time. I haven't seen it. I mean, I don't have
evidence that would say, here's an MSVS 99 sheet that says this bad
thing is going to happen if you expose it. It does say, you know, this
is an irritant. This is an acute thing. It is going to cause this, this and
this, so you better be aware of. But I'm not aware of anything that the
normal layperson in the industry would say or would see that would
necessarily show that.

Conversely, maybe there is something in the -- not in the -- maybe in
the product information or whatever which I haven't seen, just the
MSVS. So, again, I really can't place blame, necessarily, on
whomever. All I can say is I think there's an association between the
condition she now has and that exposure.
Q. And that's based upon your many years of experience as a
toxicologist?
A. Yes.

Q. It's based on your extrapolation of a number of scientific papers
and your weighing of the evidence; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. But you can't cite me to one specific paper out there that existed prior
to March of 2008 that specifically would have put laypersons without
your background on notice that exposure to their product could have
caused these long-term health conditions?
A. No.

Q. (By Mr. Burke) Okay. I think I'm almost done. Let me ask you kind
of a catchall question. Do you have any other opinions that you have
99

MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet). "MSVS" is clearly a transcription error.
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not expressed in your report or in the deposition here today as we have
been talking through this subject that you can think of right now?
A. I think we've covered the gamut. 100
The transcript clearly shows that SEC framed its questions far too narrowly-asking
Dr. Yost whether there was anything "definitively published ... that would have put a
manufacturer ... on notice that exposure to their products by somebody with the chronic health
conditions of Ms. Major would have caused her an exacerbated response which would have
included an ongoing chronic cough for the subsequent period of time?"IOI The question asked
was whether there were any "definitive" articles at the time, to which Dr. Yost testified that there
were none he was aware of. However, Dr. Yost explained in his first affidavit that statements
relating to the issues of causation and whether a manufacturer would have been on notice at the
time cannot be couched in "absolute certainty. Rather, many of the conclusions Dr. Reillyl02
draws should be based on the sum of scientific evidence and judgments of the expert
scientists.,,103

Dr. Yost explained in his affidavit that it is misleading to make absolute

statements from data that does not warrant conclusions with absolute certainty. 104
The questions put to Dr. Yost relating to the state of the science prior to the date of sale
were couched in terms of certainties and absolutes. 105 In his deposition, Dr. Yost tried to explain
that "there is no such thing as absolute proof in science."

100 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep., 153:16 - 156:10)).
101 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep., 153:16-25) (emphasis added)).
102 Dr. Reilly is a retained expert for SEC. See generally, R. 118-20 (Conf. Ex., Reilly Aff.).
103 R. 414 (Yost Aff., ~ 8).
104 R. 414 (Yost Aff., ~ 8).
105 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2, (Yost Dep. 153:16-25)).
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Q. So would you accept that conclusion as being accurate?
A. No, I would accept it as being a possibility. There's a difference
between proving something and postulating something. It's possible.

Q. When you say there's a difference between proving something and
postulating something, what do you mean that difference to be? What
is the difference between proving and postulating?
A. Well, there is no such thing as absolute proof in science. If you're a
true scientist, then nothing is ever absolute. So proof to me means a
weight of evidence argument, that the weight of the evidence provided
is convincing and -- well, convincing.

Q. And a simple - I'm sorry.
A. It's convincing to me. I'm only going to talk about myself here, but
it's convincing to me that it's true, that until proven otherwise, that's a
process that I'll accept as being proof, where there is no such thing as
true proof. 106
There is nothing inconsistent between Dr. Yost's deposition and affidavit testimony. Certainly
SEC did not identify a "direct conflict," which is what the law in Idaho requires before an
affidavit may be stricken as a sham.
Dr. Yost also cautioned in his deposition that there was a difference between questions
phrased in terms of "would cause" or "is going to cause" and questions phrased in terms of
scientific probabilities. He testified in this respect as follows:
Q. All right. Let me talk about something other than possibilities,
because in the legal profession we have to deal in probabilities. Okay?
So what I'm wondering is are you able to state based upon reasonable
scientific certainty, which I will define to you as being from a
scientific standpoint that a proposition is more probably true than not
true, are you able to say from that standpoint whether or not a person
who is sensitive to capsaicin and has a chronic respiratory condition
will get a long-term exacerbation of that condition because of that
exposure?
106

R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep., 130:1-21)).
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A. Well, it depends on what verb you use. If you say will get or can

get, I have a different answer.
Q. Okay. How would your answer be different?
A. Yes and no. It is more likely than not on the basis of the literature that
I've seen that the cough -- well, the respiratory issues that are in play
here --

Q. Ms. Major?
A. -- Ms. Major could be exacerbated to a chronic respiratory outcome.
So what I'm saying is in my opinion it is more probable than not that
that hypothesis is valid in this case. If I'm going to take somebody
with -- you know, who has been sprayed on the foot with capsaicin and
they get, you know, irritation or something, then I may not make that
same conclusion because I want to see what the association is between
type of exposure, you know, the type of issues that come about as a
result of exposure and whether the science bears up as a mechanism
for that chronic situation developing. And I think of[sic] all of those
things are consistent and valid here.
Q. SO you're saying from a reasonable scientific certainty, it's more
probable than not that Ms. Major's underlying respiratory illnesses
were exacerbated causing her to have a chronic condition?
A. Yes.[07

Furthermore, Dr. Yost's answer made it clear that his opinions were not based on any
single definitive study or article. He explained that it was based on a preponderance of the
scientific evidence: "1 don't think it exists except through the preponderance of evidence, and it
may very well be that other people don't believe that that's the case, but I do.,,[08 He explained
in both of his affidavits that he was relying on an entire body of scientific literature and not a
. Ie de fiImtlve
.. stud y. [09
smg
SEC also cited to Dr. Yost's affirmative response in his deposition where he was asked
107 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep. 138:15 - 140:5».
108 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep. 154:6-10».
109 R. 412-13 (Yost Aff., ~ 6); 1066-1070-71 (Yost 2d Aff., ~~ 6-8, 12-13).
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"Is it your understanding that the adverse health effects that exposure to OC and capsaicinoids by
humans are generally deemed to be temporary, reversible and not long-term?" I to However, that
testimony is not in conflict with his second affidavit because it is true that, generally speaking,
most individuals exposed to OC and/or capsaicinoids experience temporary reversible effects.
That says nothing about the risks to certain populations that are already sensitized to an extent to
OC and/or capsaicinoids. Dr. Yost explains in much detail the risks such products pose to a
certain segment of society who react to OC products differently than what is expected generally.
Throughout SEC's arguments below, there was an osculation between representing
Dr. Yost's testimony as being more general than specific, and then when it was convenient,
representing his testimony as more specific than general. When Dr. Yost clearly stated that he
was relying on a body of literature to support his opinions, SEC's counsel framed the questions
in terms of the specific, i.e., do you have a definitive study that proves OC spray causes these
particular chronic symptoms. Dr. Yost was honest and answered that he did not have such a
study because one does not exist. He further explained, however, that when the entire body of
literature is examined, the information was there that a risk of acute and chronic respiratory
injury exists for certain populations.
Then SEC skewed Dr. Yost's testimony as stating that OC and/or capsaicinoids in all
cases only cause temporary reversible effects. I I I

That was not his testimony at all.

His

testimony was that while the effects of OC and/or capsaicinoids are generally temporary and

ItO
III

R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep. 63:4-7)).
R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep. 100:22 -101:15)).
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reversible, there are individuals for whom that general rule does not apply.112

There are

individuals who are already sensitized to some extent for whom further exposure poses a more
serious risk of chronic respiratory injury.113

Unfortunately, the trial court adopted much of

SEC's flawed reasoning and committed error by striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit as being a
sham, when it was not.

C.

It Was Error for the Trial Court to Deny Ms. Major's Motion for Reconsideration
Where Dr. Yost's Final Affidavit Explained Any Perceived Conflict Between His
Deposition Testimony and His Prior Affidavits
The trial court erred when it denied Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration of the trial

court's orders granting SEC's motion to strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit and granting summary
judgment. On October 24, 2011, Ms. Major filed her motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's orders granting SEC's motion to strike Dr. Yost's second affidavit, and granting SEC's
motions for summary judgment. 114 In support of her motion, Ms. Major filed a third affidavit of
Dr. Yost that explained any perceived conflict between his deposition testimony and his second
affidavit, and provided additional literature that supported his opinion that at the time SEC sold
its product to IDOC, it should have known the risk of acute and chronic respiratory injury. I IS
SEC moved to strike Dr. Yost's third affidavit, and the trial court denied that motion. 116
However, the trial court also denied Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration by finding that the
third affidavit failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether SEC knew
112 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep. 62:1 63:8,101:21
113 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 4, Ex. 2 (Yost Dep. 102:13-19».
114 R. 1745-46.
115 R. 1747-60, 1766-2037.
116 Tr. (1126112), 24:6-11.
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102:8».

or should have known that their product posed a risk of chronic respiratory injury when it sold it
to IDOC. 117
The trial court stated that at "no point did Dr. Yost explain why there is a - difference
between his deposition testimony and the testimony he's giving now.,,1l8 However, Dr. Yost's
third affidavit explained his deposition testimony and how it did not conflict with what he had
said in his first two affidavits. 119 The trial court should have therefore reconsidered its earlier
ruling striking Dr. Yost's second affidavit, and its granting of summary judgment to SEC, but did
not. By not doing so, the trial court committed reversible error.
The trial court was also critical of Dr. Yost for not specifically identifying the portions of
each of the scientific articles he cited as support for his opinion. 120 However, Dr. Yost's third
affidavit did discuss specific sections of several publications he cited, and quoted language from
them in support of his opinion as to the foreseeability of the type of injury suffered by
Ms. Major. 121 After quoting several sections of one article published by Dr. Michael D. Cohen
in 1997, Dr. Yost stated the following in his third affidavit:
In another portion of the review, Dr. Cohen states: "These studies provide
firm evidence for a toxic effect of capsaicin on lung function of certain
asthmatics." Dr. Cohen noted that many of the studies of the effects of
capsaicin use dosages much lower than those that result from exposure to
OC by hand held devices used in law enforcement. Dr. Cohen concludes
his article with the following warning: "Use of peppers pray should be
restricted in order to prevent serious injuries, which are most likely to
Tr. (1/26/12), 23:23 - 29:3.
lIS Tr. (1/26/12), 24:12-14.
119 R. 1748-56.
120 Tr. (1/26/12), 26:19-25.
121 R. 1756-58.
117
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occur in people with asthma or chronic lung disease." 122
Dr. Yost also discussed Dr. Groneberg's 2004 work:
Groneberg published MODELS OF CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE PULMONARY
DISEASE in 2004 and made clear that it was understood that depending
on the duration and intensity of exposure to noxious inhalants, there
could be induced signs of chronic inflammation and airway
remodeling. Capsaicinoids would be classified as a noxious inhalant and,
in many ways, would be understood as one of the primary noxious
inhalants. Groneberg's work supports the notion that long-term changes
to the respiratory tract may take place due to exposure to capsaicinoids
depending on the concentration and duration of exposure. 123
Dr. Yost also discussed three of his own publications - published in conjunction with
Dr. Reilly, who is SEC's retained expert - that support his opinions regarding the foreseeability
of injury posed by SEC's OC products:
I would also like to point out that my own work with Dr. Reilly in 2005
recognizes that

lung epithelium is the initial barrier that xenobiotics encounter
upon inhalation and is a frequent target for toxicants (Burgel &
Nadel, 2004). Damage to the respiratory epithelium compromises
respiratory function by increasing the susceptibility of individuals
to subsequent lung injury and infections, and ultimately contributes
to hypersensitivity disorders such as asthma and COPD (Kasper &
Haroske, 1996; Kuwano et aI., 2001; Selman et aI., 2001; Witschi,
1991). Activation of TRPVl (capsaicin receptor, VR1) in lung
epithelial cells by certain types of airborne particulate pollutants
and prototypical agonists initiates inflammatory responses and
promotes cell death (Agopynan et aI., 2003a, b, 2004; Oortgiesen
et aI., 2000; Reillyet aI., 2003; Veronesi et aI., 1999b).
Since capsaicin is the primary agonist of TRPV1, it is clear that OC
exposure can cause long-term adverse health effects involving the
respiratory system. I bring this up because this article was cited in my

122
123

R. 1757.
R. 1757.
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first affidavit filed with this Court. 124
And, quoting from his and Dr. Reilly's 2007 work, Dr. Yost stated the following:
These findings are significant within the context of lung inflammatory
diseases where elevated concentrations of endogenous TRPV 1 agonists
are probably produced in sufficient quantities to cause TRPV1 activation
and lung cell death. 125
And,
[a] gain, in METABOLISM OF CAPSAICINOIDS BY P450 ENZYMES: . . . ,
published in 2006, Dr. Reilly and I recognized that "Capsaicinoids are also
toxic to many cells via TRPV1-dependant and independent mechanisms."
This conclusion is further supported by CAPSAICIN-INDUCED
NEUROTOXICITY IN CULTURED DORSEL ROOT GANGLION NEURONS, 1995,
where it was concluded that capsaicin kills a subpopulation of sensory
. . a receptor-operated ch anne.·
I ,,126
neurons b y actlvatmg

In addition to the scientific publications discussed by Dr. Yost, he provided a copy of an
MSDS from another manufacturing company for its capsaicin product which included a warning
that it '''[m]ay cause sensitization by inhalation'" and "identifies the target organ as 'nerves' and
... the compound as being 'Highly Toxic. ",\27 That MSDS was dated October 27, 2004. 128
Irrespective of the trial court's errors, Dr. Yost's third affidavit gave rise to a genuine
issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. It was reversible error for
the trial court to deny Ms. Major's motion for reconsideration, and this Court should reverse and
remand for trial.

R.
125 R.
126 R.
127 R.
128 R.
124

1757.
1758.
1758.
1749.
1749.
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D.

It Was Error to Grant SEC Summary Judgment as to Ms. Major's Claims

for Acute Injury When There \Vere No Warnings on the Product Label of
Any Kind of Respiratory Injury, and the Type of Acute Injury Ms. Major
Suffered Was Not Known to Her
The trial court erred when it granted SEC summary judgment on the claim for acute
injury based on its incorrect finding that Ms. Major was aware of the risk of acute injury and that
the risk of acute injury was printed on the labe1. 129 All evidence in the record was that SEC
never included any warning of respiratory injury, whether acute or chronic, on its product
labe1. 130 While Ms. Major had training on the effects of OC products, nothing in her training
prepared her for the adverse effects she experienced during her March 3,2008 training. 13l None
of the training materials addressed the known fact that persons with respiratory illness are at risk
of suffering more severe effects and possible injury from OC exposure.1 32 The MK-9 Fogger's
MSDS did include a statement that the product "may cause more severe, temporary, effects on
those persons who are asthmatics or suffer from emphysema.,,133 But, Ms. Major never saw the
MSDS, and that information was not included on the product labe1. 134
Also, SEC knew that there was a health risk associated with overexposure to OC but did
not warn against it. SEC's vice-president considered other manufacturers selling 1.45%, 2.0%,

129 Tr. (9/26/11), 195:19 - 199:4.
130 R. 1051-57.
131 R. 1058-63.
132 R. 1058-63.
133 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson AfC ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 125: 1 - 127: 13, and Ex. J)).
Ms. Major never saw SEC's MSDS for the SABRE Red, Law Enforcement Unit, 10% OC, MK9 Fogger. R. 1058-63 (Major Aff., ~ 4).
134 R. 1058-63 (Major Aff., ~ 4).
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and maybe even 3.0% capsaicinoids OC products as irresponsible because they are dangerous. 135
The risks of those products, according to SEC's vice-president, were that they "Cause -- could
cause some -- could possibly cause long-term damage or extremely long recovery
periods.,,136

Certainly, if SEC was aware that overexposure to OC could cause long term

damage, it must also have been aware that an acute injury was also a likelihood.
SEC was aware that its product posed a special risk of harm to persons with pulmonary
illness. SEC's vice-president testified in his deposition:
Q. Okay. Particularly there are concerns with the safety of OC products
when used on individuals with pulmonary issues, generally?
Q. Respiratory issues.
A. The effects may be greater. 137

SEC had a legal duty to warn that a pre-existing respiratory condition could be
aggravated by exposure to its OC products. It breached that duty by not including that known
information in either the training information or on the product label.
In this case, Ms. Major was exposed to a high concentration of highly aerosolized 10%
OC and immediately experienced a strong burning in her lungs that was much worse than any of
her prior experiences with OC exposure and lasted far longer than the 20 to 30 minutes that the

135 R. 384-409 (Conf Ex., Overson Aff., ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 64:3-21)). By comparison,
SEC's SABRE Red products contain 1.33% capsaicinoids. See R. 384-409 (Conf Ex., Overson
Aff, ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 60: 10 - 64:2, and Ex. B)).
136 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff, ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 64:3-21) (emphasis added)).
137 R. 384-409 (Conf. Ex., Overson Aff, ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 44:12-17 and generally 21:24
- 43:11,44:12-17,50:10 - 59:17,63:6-22,64:3 - 65:4,130:7 - 137:25,139:10 - 140:12,157:14
163:5, and Exs. B, L-O)).
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effects normally took to stop.138

The coughing was much worse than any of her prior

experiences with OC exposure.1 39 The next day she went to the doctor because the coughing
would not stop.140 Her doctor took her off work because she could not work in her condition. 141
Her bronchitis took until almost April to resolve. 142 Her bronchitis was worse than it had been in
the past. 143 Ms. Major's knowledge, training, observations and experience were that the effects
of OC last approximately 20 to 30 minutes and that the product was safe. What she did not know
was that the MK-9 Fogger was different than the other OC products that she had been exposed to
in terms of the health risks that it posed because of its highly aerosolized nature. 144
While she understood that, unlike the sprays, the fogger was specifically designed to
irritate the respiratory tract, she did not know the adverse health effects of being exposed to
aerosolized OC while a person has chronic cough, bronchitis or other respiratory illness. 145 She
was not aware that persons with respiratory illness are more sensitive to

oc. 146

She was not

aware that OC complicates respiratory illnesses. 147 She was not aware that OC exposure while
she had bronchitis would make the bronchitis worse and make it harder to get wel1. 148 She was

138 R.
139 R.
140 R.
141 R.
142 R.
143 R.
144 R.
145 R.
146 R.
147 R.
148 R.

1688-93 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~ 2).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
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not aware of the safety concerns of respiratory overexposure to OC. 149
Had Ms. Major known the true danger involved in being exposed to aerosolized OC
while suffering from a respiratory illness, she would have refused the training. 150
E.

The Trial Court Erred When It Dismissed Ms. Major's Acute Injury Claim
on Summary Judgment and Her Claims for All Damages Arising From Her
Acute Injuries
Ms. Major's acute injury claim should not have been dismissed on summary judgment

and she should have been allowed to present her case to a jury for all damages arising from the
acute injury, including long-term aggravation of her respiratory condition. SEC placed the focus
on chronic injury by successfully moving to dismiss chronic injury damages from the case,
which is an odd result considering that there is evidence of the foreseeable acute injury causing
the chronic injury. 15 1 However, even if the chronic injuries were unforeseeable, since the acute

R. 1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
R. 1688-93 (Major Aff., ~~ 3-7).
151 See Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 121 (1963) (once a threshold case is
established showing some foreseeable injury, all damages that flow from the defendant's
negligence are recoverable irrespective of whether all the injuries were foreseeable) (citing Baal
v. Electric Battery Co., 98 F.2d 815, 819 (3 rd Cir. 1938) (cancer caused by inhalation of acidic
gas); Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 208 N.W. 901, 903-905 (Wisc. 1926) (collecting
authorities) (wrongful death resulting from a finger cut by broken milk bottle); Restatement,
Torts, § 435; 2 Harper and James, Torts, 1139-1140 (1956); Prosser, Torts, 260 (2d ed.); Seavey,
}.{r. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 48 Yale L. J. 390, 402-403); Aff. of Major, ~~2, 4-7;
Aff. of Counsel in Opp. to Defs MSJ and in Supp. of Pltfs Cross-MPSJ, ~ 3, Ex. 1 (Pacheco
Dep., 28:2-22, 34:1 - 38:11, 47:1 - 64:14,73:13 - 75:1,88:11 - 90:25, 120:2-21, 121:10-24,
122:25 - 127:15, 142:9-17, and Exs. 69, 72, & 73 (Bates Nos. NJH 48, 63, 80-87), ~ 9, Ex. 7
(Schaffer Dep., 76:4 - 77:1,90:16 - 91:16), ~ 10, Ex. 8 (Nance Dep., 21:24 - 43:11,44:12 48:6,50: 10 - 60: 16,63:6-22,64:3 - 65:4,90:4 - 94:24, 124:25 - 127:21, 130:7 - 137:25, 139:10
- 140:12, 157:14 - 163:5, and Exs. B, D, E, J, & L-O), ~ 11, Ex. 9 (Link Dep., 57:1 - 58:25;
60:5 - 62: 15); Yost 2d Aff., ~~ 9-13; Aff. of Counsel in Supp. of Pltfs Mtn for Reconsideration,
and in Opp. to Defs Second MSJ, ~ 3, Ex. 1; Aff. of Major in Opp. to Defs 3d MSJ, ~~ 2-10.
149
150
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injuries were foreseeable, Ms. Major should be able to recover for both under well-established
case law. 152 In Burkland v. Oregon Short Line R. CO.,153 the Idaho Supreme Court held that an
instruction limiting the plaintiff s recovery to foreseeable damages was error:
The true rule, as we understand it, does not require that the defendant must
have been able to foresee the precise injury which in fact resulted from the
accident, or the particular, injurious result which might be inflicted upon
person or property as the result thereof; on the other hand, the law only
requires that he shall be able to understand and appreciate that results of
some kind of injurious nature may be reasonably anticipated from the
negligent act of omission or commission. 154
In this case, since Ms. Major suffered an acute respiratory injury from exposure to SEC's
MK-9 Fogger, and SEC knew when it sold the product to IDOC that the MK-9 Fogger posed a
health risk to people who have a respiratory illness, Ms. Major should be able to recover
damages for her acute and chronic injuries.
The trial court erred by granting SEC's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Major's
acute injury claims, and this Court should reverse.
F.

Ms. Major is Entitled to an Award of Fees and Costs on Appeal
In the event she is the prevailing party, Ms. Major should be awarded attorney fees and

costs on her appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-107 and 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

152 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2639 (2011); Gallick, 372 U.S. at 121;
Baal, 98 F.2d at 819; Koehler, 208 N.W. at 903-905; Restatement, Torts, § 435.
153 56 Idaho 703, 777 (1936).
154 56 Idaho 703, 777 (1936) (citing De Matt v. Knowlton, 100 N.J. Law 296, 299, 126 A. 327,
328 (1924); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. McBride, 36 F.2d 841, 841-42 (6 th Cir. 1930); Soda v.
Marriott,5 P.2d 675, 677 (Ca. 3 Dist. App. 1931); Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., 240 P.
53, 54-55 (Ca. 3 Dist. App. 1925); Lashley v. Dawson, 160 A. 738, 742 (Md. 1932); Sisk v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 67 S.W. 2d 830,834 (Mo. App. 1934).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment that dismissed all
of Ms. Major's claims and remand the case for trial. A genuine issue of material fact existed that
precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether SEC knew or should have known of the
risk of acute and chronic respiratory injury posed by its MK-9 Fogger. The state of the science
at the time was such that SEC had at least constructive notice of the risk of injury involved when
they sold their product to IDOC. Dr. Yost's affidavits clearly established that the risks were
foreseeable at the time.

None of his affidavits were shams as there was no direct conflict

between his affidavits and his deposition testimony. Rather, the trial court misread the affidavits
and the depositions by taking his statements out of context and failing to view them in a light
most favorable to Ms. Major. Finally, the trial court's order granting SEC summary judgment as
to Ms. Major's acute injury claims must be reversed since the clear record shows that SEC did
not warn of the known acute injuries their product posed to persons with respiratory illness.
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should reverse and remand for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of June, 2012.
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